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NOTES
Antitrust—Noerr-Pennington Doctrine—Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of
Rockford, Inc.' — Plaintiff (Metro) and defendant (CATV) were cable
television companies competing for a franchise from the City Council
of Rockford, Illinois. The Illinois legislature has delegated to
municipalities thee power to grant cable television franchises, 2 and pur-
suant to that power the Rockford City Council granted a franchise to
CATV. It denied Metro a franchise on three separate occasions. 3
Metro operated a cable television system in unincorporated areas
near Rockford and wished to extend the system into that city. Defend-
ant Rock River Television, Inc. (WCEE) established CATV in order
to compete with Metro for a cable television franchise and to keep
Metro out of Rockford. 4 WCEE and CATV, through common officers
and shareholders, enlisted the support of Mayor Schleicher and Al-
derman Skolrood, who, in return for "campaign contributions," were
to prevent Metro from gaining a franchise from the City Council.' In
April, 1966, the council's license committee recommended a franchise
grant to Metro, but, due to the influence of Schleicher the full council
instead granted a franchise to CA'FV. 6
Metro applied for a franchise again in 1970, accompanying that
application with a $100,000 deposit insuring speedy construction, but
was denied a hearing due to pressure on the council from Skolrood
and Schleicher.' At the same time, two officers of CATV told the
License Committee that CATV had bought land and constructed an
antenna (presumably to show they were progressing), when it was ac-
tually WCEE that had done so. 6
A third application filed by Metro in 1971 was also denied
without a hearing." A subcommittee, of which Skolrood was a member,
was formed to set up a procedure whereby a second franchise would
be granted, but the sub-committee secretly decided to leave CATV
with the only franchise.'" Finally, when Metro sought a permit from
516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
2 "The corporate authorities of each municipality may license, franchise and tax
the business of operating a community antenna television system as hereinafter de-
fined." ILL. REV. Si'n'n. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (Stipp. 1975). The statute sets no minimum or
maximum number to be franchised and leaves broad discretion to the local authorities.
See id.
3 516 F.2d at 222-23. The detailed allegations of the complaint are set out in the
district court opinion, Metro Cable Co. v, CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350,
352.56 (N.D. [II. 1974). The facts discussed in the text arc those alleged by the plaintiff
(Metro) since the case came to the circuit court on appeal from the district court order
dismissing the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See id. at 361.
4 Metro Cable Co. v, cArry of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 353 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
3 1d.
"Id. at 354.
Id.
"Id.
Id.
"Id. at 359-55. The mayor also filed a certificate with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission stating that a public hearing had been held on CATV's franchise ap-
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the City Council to use city utility poles in order to provide cable ser-
vice to areas outsideRockford, an officer of CATV misrepresented to
the council that transmission lines were available from the Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. and the permit was denied."
Metro brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois' 2 alleging that CATV and others, includ-
ing Schleicher and Skolrood, had conspired to restrain trade and
Monopolize the cable television transmission market in Rockford in
violation of sections 1 13 and 2' 4
 of the Sherman Act. Metro sought in-
junctive relief" and damages of $3,000,000 trebled." The District
Court granted CATV's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which the relief could be granted," holding that under Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 18 and United Mine
plication, when in fact no hearing had been held. Id. at 355. It is not clear what Metro
alleges with regard to the certificate. FCC regulations require that before the cablevi-
sion company can receive the required FCC certification, "[t]he franchisee's legal,
character, financial, technical, and other qualifications, and the adequacy and feasibility
of its construction arrangements, [must be) approved by the franchising authority as
part of a full public proceeding affording due process ...." 47 C.F.R. 76.31(a)(1)
(Supp. 1974). The regulations reflect a policy of allowing local authorities to issue
franchises for cable television subject to the minimum standards set out in § 76.31. The
FCC polices the process through the certification procedure. However, the FCC has
held that where the franchise was granted before adoption of the rules in 1972, the
franchise award must only be in "substantial compliance" with the new rules. FCC, Re-
consideration of Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. al 326, 366 (1972).
When CATV of Rockford applied for certification, and Metro Cable opposed the appli-
cation, raising many of the allegations made in the present case, the FCC held: "An ex-
amination of CATV of Rockford's franchise as well as the Mayor's accompanying af-
fidavit persuades us that a public franchise-award proceeding in which the qualifica-
tions of CATV of Rockford were considered was held ... ." CATV of Rocktord, Inc.,
38 F.C.C. 2d 10, 14 (1972), petition for reconsideration denied, 40 F.C.C.2d 493 (1973).
Nonetheless, the decision of the FCC in this case has no relevance to Metro's
Sherman Act suit. In a case where the FCC approved an exchange of television stations,
the approval did not bar the prosecution of an antitrust complaint against one of the
transferors, who allegedly conspired with a subsidiary to force another party to ex-
change its large market area station for a smaller market area station. United States v.
Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 337, 343-44 (1959). The Court held that the
"courts retained jurisdiction to pass on alleged antitrust violations irrespective of Com-
mission action." Id. at 343-44.
" Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 355 (N.D. III.
1974).
12
 Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. ill. 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...."
" 15 U.S.C, § 2 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of' a misdemeanor ...."
IS
 Injunctive relief is available under 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
" Treble damages are authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
' 7
 Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 361 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
1 " 365 U.S. 127, reh. denied, 365 U.S. 875 (1961).
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Workers v. Pennington,'" the alleged activities were immune from anti-
trust sanction." The Noerr
-Pennington doctrine states that genuine ef-
forts to influence government action are not violative of the Sherman
Act even though those efforts are directed at gaining a monopoly or
restraining trade."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, and HELD: CATV's alleged efforts were a genuine attempt to
influence government action, and therefore were immune from anti-
trust scrutiny. 22 This note will first examine Noerr, Pennington and the
Supreme Court's decision in California Motor Transportation Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited. 23 It will then discuss the propriety of extending
Noerr protection to the acts alleged by the plaintiff in Metro Cable. It
will be noted that although the complaint arguably asserted that a
bribe was given and received, thus making the mayor and alderman
co-conspirators, the court characterized the transaction as a campaign
contribution and thereby avoided the difficult issue of whether an of-
ficial co-conspirator would preclude a Noerr defense. Next, the court's
limited reading of California Motor and expansive reading of Noerr will
be examined to determine whether the court devised a proper stand-
ard of review for the alleged acts of' defendant CATV. Finally, the
court's discussion and arguendo application of the "sham exception,""
first noted in Noerr and later expanded in California Motor, will be
evaluated.
1. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
Noerr involved competition between the railroad and the truck-
ing industries in the long distance hauling business. The railroads,
through a public relations firm, had conducted a malicious and
fraudulent campaign" to gain passage and enforcement of laws and
regulations detrimental to the trucking industry." Several trucking
companies sued, and the district court held that the railroad's acts
constituted a violation of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act." The
court of appeals affirmed, 28
 but the Supreme Court reversed."
Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit such campaigns to influence the legis-
'" 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
2 " Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 358 (N.D. III.
1974).
" Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669.70.
" 516 F.2d at 222.
23
 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
24 See text at note 36 infra.
" 365 U.S. at 133.
sa Id. at 129.
27
 Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp.
768, 775.811 (E.D. Pa, 1957).
" Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d
218 (3d Cir. 1959) (per curiarn).
" 365 U.S. at 145.
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lative or executive branch even if conducted with an anticompetitive
intent. 30 He noted that "where a restraint upon trade or monopoliza-
tion is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private
action, no violation of the Act can be made out." 3 ' It follows, the
Court reasoned, that the Sherman Act cannot preclude two or more
persons from "acting together to persuade the legislative or executive
to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a
restraint or monopoly."32
The Court noted that a combination to influence a political body
is not the type of act the Sherman Act was intended to proscribe, and
reasoned that to extend the Act to such combinations would impute to
Congress an intent to regulate "political activity," thus impairing the
functioning of government by cutting off needed public input. 33 The
Court further emphasized that it is normal and legitimate political ac-
tivity to lobby in favor of governmental action economically detrimen-
tal to competitors." Moreover, the Court stated that to apply the
Sherman Act to such activities would raise constitutional problems re-
garding the rights of association and petition guaranteed by the First
Amendment: "We cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an in-
tent to invade these freedoms." 35
The Court noted an exception to the enunciated rule: "There
may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what
is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified." 36 Thus, in order for the activity to
be immune, there must be "a genuine effort to influence legislation
and law enforcement practice."
Pennington appeared to expand the scope of the Noerr doctrine.
In Pennington, a small coal company alleged a conspiracy between cer-
tain large coal companies and the United Mine Workers to put the
smaller companies out of business. Part of the scheme was to per-
suade the Secretary of Labor to set a high minimum wage for com-
panies selling to the Tennessee Valley Authority." In addition, the
TVA was urged to refrain from "spot market" purchases, some of
whirh could be made from companies not meeting the required wage
" Id, at 139.
" Id. at 136, citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
" 365 U.S. at 136.
"Id. at 136-37.
" Id. at 139.
35 Id. at 138. The Court expressly declined to rule on the constitutional defense
asserted by the railroads, noting that the construction given to the Sherman Act made
such a ruling unnecessary. Id. at l32 n.6.
"Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
"Id.
3° 381 U.S. at 660.
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level." The Court held that "Woint efforts to influence public officials
do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as
part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."'"
Whether "public official" was consciously used instead of Noerr's
"legislature or executive"' branch is not clear; however, the question
was mooted when the Supreme Court decided California Motor Trans-
port Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.'" In California Motor, the Court held that
efforts to influence adjudicative bodies, whether judicial or adminis-
trative, may also receive protection under Noerr. 43 California Motor
involved a dispute between competing trucking companies. Plaintiff
truckers alleged that defendant truckers jointly financed and carried
out a plan to oppose in agencies and reviewing courts all of plaintiffs'
applications for operating rights, and made known the plan to plain-
tiffs in order to deter them from making such applications."
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, emphasized two princi-
ples as the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of the Noerr
doctrine. First, the Sherman Act does not regulate political activity
such as efforts to influence the government. 45 Second, Congress did
not intend, through the antitrust laws, to invade the constitutional
right of petition. 46 In extending the Noerr protection to activities of
citizens intended to influence courts and agencies, however, the court
seemed to focus solely on the latter interest, 47 and held that to deny
protection "would be destructive of rights of association and of
petition." 4 s
The Court proceeded to define the constitutional protection in
the context of a Noerr sham exception "adapted to the adjudicatory
process."46 Justice Douglas noted that although individuals had a right
to petition agencies and courts in order to challenge their competitors'
permit applications, "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may
emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative
and judicial processes have been abused."5° In California Motor this
abuse, combined with the defendants' establishment of a joint fund to
carry out the program of harassment and their publication to plain-
tiffs of their intent to use these methods, indicated an intent to "de-
39 Id.
" Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
" A/cern 365 U.S. at 136.
4z404 U.S. 508 (1972).
13 1d. at 510-11,
44 Id. at 511.
43 1d. at 510.
" Id,
47 See id. at 510-17.
49 Id, The Court ignored the "political activity" aspects of Noerr, which presum-
ably are inapposite to an adjudicative setting.
49 /d, at 516.
"Id. at 513.
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prive the competitors of Meaningful access to agencies and courts,""
rather than an intent to influence public officials and, as such, placed
the activities within the sham exception and outside First Amendment
protection."
IL POST-CALIFORNIA MOTOR: METRO CABLE
Where the Noerr doctrine stands after California Motor is still not
entirely clear. 55
 Several issues raised in Metro Cable derive little guid-
ance from the California Motor opinion. First, does the presence of an
official co-conspirator—as an abuse of the governmental
process—preclude Noerr immunity? Second, what standards should be
used in applying the immunity, and should different standards apply
in legislative and adjudicative settings? Third, what should the test be
for the determination of a sham?
A. The Official Co-Conspirator
Clearly, the acceptance of a bribe by a public official implies suf-
ficient involvement to deem him a co-conspirator in related illegal
activity. 54 The issue presented in Metro Cable is whether official in-
volvement in a conspiracy to restrain trade is enough to remove the
Noerr protection.
There is language in California Motor which supports the propo-
sition that where a public official is a named co-conspirator, the Noerr
immunity should not apply. California Motor cited Hannan v. Valley Na-
tional Bank" for the proposition that "[clonspiracy with a licensing au-
thority to eliminate a competitor may ... result in an antitrust
transgression,"56
 as part of a general discussion of why certain con-
duct, protected in a political context, may result in antitrust sanctions
in an adjudicatory setting. 57 The Court specifically stated that bribery
Id. at 512.
"Id.
53 See generally Note, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the An-
titrust and Constitutional Ramifications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. C1N. L. REV. 281
(1973).
54
 A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons with a common design
to do an unlawful act. American Tobacco Co. v, United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810
(1945). A conspirator is one of those persons. However, where a public official is in-
volved, especially a legislator, special caution is required before deeming him a con-
spirator. See, Comment, 8l HARV. 1. REV. 847, 857 (1968). The question should be
whether the official is acting pursuant to his public authority or to private interests. See,
Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MicH. L. REV. 333,
340-41 (1967). Whether official immunity is available is a separate question, since the
antitrust issue is whether the presence of an official co-conspirator removes Noerr protec-
tion as to the private parties. It is suggested that where an official agrees to further pri-
vate anticompetitive interests in return for a bribe, he is a party to a conspiracy.
" 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
56
 404 U.S. at 513.
57 /d. at 512-13.
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of a public purchasing agent could give rise to an antitrust violation,"
In Harman, the Ninth Circuit had held that Noerr protection did
not apply where the Attorney General of Arizona in his role as a co-
conspirator brought a baseless suit to place a financial institution in
receivership, where that act was part of a larger scheme to
monopolize." However, Harman was not followed five years later by
the Ninth Circuit in Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 6 °
where county commissioners were alleged to be conspirators in the
grant of an exclusive garbage collection franchise." The majority in
Sun Valley felt that Pennington had eroded the Harman decision," be-
cause Pennington had held that an effort to achieve anti-competitive
action is not a Sherman Act violation either standing alone "or as part
of a broader scheme;"" thus, they found no violation of the Sherman
Act." More important than its "broader scheme" language, however,
is the fact that Pennington precluded relief for damages resulting from
"the act of a public official who is not claimed to be a co-conspirator." 66
Sun Valley was not mentioned three years later in the California
Motor opinion, but, as noted above, Harman was cited in support of
the Supreme Court's reasoning that certain unethical conduct in the
adjudicatory process could result in antitrust sanctions." The "larger
scheme" aspect of Harman clearly had been rejected in Pennington; 87
however, the fact that California Motor cited Harman indicates that the
possibility remains open that the presence of an official co-conspirator
will remove Noerr immunity.""
Perhaps in recognition of this confusing development, however,
the court in Metro Cable skirted the official co-conspirator question.
Metro's complaint, read liberally, alleged that CATV bribed the
mayor and an alderman through "campaign contributions." 89 Explicit
"id. at 513, citing Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1965).
" 339 F.2d at 566.
" 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
'II Id. at 342.
63 Id, at 342.43.
83 381 U.S. at 670.
01
 420 F.2d at 342-43.
85 381 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added).
86 404 U.S.. at 512-13.
" 381 U.S. at 670. See text at note 40 supra.
66 See Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Israel,
defendants, including a Food and Drug Administration official, were alleged to have
conspired to keep plaintiffs drug off the market. Id. at 274. After examining the Noerr
cases, the court concluded that "actions which impair the fair and impartial functioning
of an administrative agency" should not be protected under Noerr. Id. at 278. Conclud-
ing that the complaint• alleged a "sham" exception, the court reversed the lower court's
grant of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 279. The court did not discuss whether Noerr was
affected by the presence of an official co-conspirator, but left open the possibility of an
official immunity defense on remand. Id. at 275 n. la.
69
 Complaint at 8, Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350
(N.D. Ill. 1974).	 -
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reference was made in Metro's brief to an alleged bribe." However,
while the court discussed whether the presence of an official co-
conspirator would remove the Noerr protection, 7 ' no conclusion was
reached because it read the complaint as alleging a traditional cam-
paign contribution and concluded that, as such, the contribution was
not enough to make the mayor and alderman alleged
co-conspirators. 72
 "Plaintiff's position is in essence that an agreement
to attempt to induce legislative action is a `conspiracy,' and that if
some of the `conspirators' persuade a member of the legislative body
to agree to support their cause, he becomes a 'co-conspirator' and a
Sherman Act violation results. Such a rule would in practice abrogate
the Noerr doctrine." 73
So stated, the conclusion is indisputable. Noerr clearly protects
the political, activity of petitioning the legislature. The conclusion fails
to distinguiih, however, between petitioning to induce legislative ac-
tion and bribery to induce legislative action. Failure to protect the lat-
ter activity would not abrogate Noerr, since bribery is neither political
activity which requires protection nor an exercise of the First
Amendment right to petition." On the other hand, by its interpreta-
tion of the complaint, the court in Metro Cable was able to avoid this
necessary distinction. Carefully read, therefore, Metro Cable states only
that campaign contributions are not enough to make a public official
a co-conspirator. Hence, the mayor and the alderman were not
co-conspirators. 75 Metro Cable does not hold, however, that a public of-
ficial cannot be a co-conspirator or that if he were, Noerr would
apply."
7° Brief far Appellant at 17, Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516
F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
21
 Id. at 229-30.
72 Id. at 230, 231.
"Id. at 230.
74 See Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Colo. 1975). The plaintiffs argued that /slam should not apply "because defendant's ef-
forts to influence the Department of Agriculture included bribery and illegal campaign
contributions, activities which are certainly not protected by the First Amendment." Id.
at 701. The court accepted the argument that there was no exercise of First Amend-
ment rights but applied Noerr, evidently holding that whether political lobbying includes
illegal acts is irrelevant since the Sherman Act is not applicable to lobbying. Id. at 705.
It is submitted that the court's conclusion is incorrect. Illegal acts are not political activ-
ity and thus are not the type of conduct protected under Norm. See Sacramento Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971), which noted,
"NE does not seem to this Court that the doctrines of Noerr and Pennington were in-
tended to protect those who employed illegal means to influence their representatives
in government." Id. at 1099. Cf. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1314 (4th
Cir. 1972) (bribes are not protected First Amendment activity simply because they are
written or spoken).
"See 516 F.2d at 230.
" One commentator has framed the issue of whether or not official involvement
in the conspiracy should preclude a Noerr defense in a different way: Is the official act
taken a truly governmental act—a fact which triggers the Noerr analysis—or does the
act amount to a private action which is beyond the scope of the official's authority? If
518
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B. Standards: One or Several?
California Motor extended Noerr protection to efforts to influence
courts and agencies but, in so doing, left considerable uncertainty as
to the standards to be applied in these adjudicative settings. In Metro
Cable, Judge Tone, apparently aware of the confusion resulting from
California Motor," noted that "[w]e must take the Supreme Court at its
word when it reaffirms the authority of Noerr."" Focusing on the im-
portance of the factual background, the court read California Motor as
applying only to adjudicative settings, leaving Noerr relatively un-
touched in a legislative or executive setting. Adopting the broad lan-
guage of Noerr and Pennington, the court concluded:
Whatever the significance of the citation of Harman in
California Motor Transport's discussion of why unethical con-
duct may not be immune in an adjudicative, as opposed to
a political, setting, that discussion is not applicable here, for
the Rockford City Council was a legislative body, acting as
such, and the conduct challenged here thus occurred in a
political setting."
These conclusions—that California Motor does not apply in a political
setting and that a legislative body is necessarily political—are impor-
tant, because Metro Cable is the first case to interpret Calffornia Motor
in an arguably political setting. 8 °
In California Motor, the Court distinguished political from ad-
judicative settings: "[M]isrepresentations, condoned in the political
arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
the latter is the case then the Noerr protection should not be available. Costilo, Anthraces
Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 Mini. L. REV, 333, 340, 350 (1967).
Another commentator has approached the official involvement issue by distinguishing
between an official making a decision in a political context and an official making a de-
cision furthering the economic interests of the private party. Comment, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 847 (1968). If the latter, the author argues that the antitrust laws should he applic-
able because application of the Sherman Act would not impinge on the political process.
However, in the political context, the "difficulty of distinguishing between genuinely
political, if sordidly self-interested, approaches to officials and those which make the of-
ficials 'participants' in the conspiracy suggests that the antitrust laws should be applied
only in the most extreme cases." Id. at 857. Such an extreme case would presumably
arise where the official was bribed or where his personal business interests would gain
from a reduction of competition. See id. at 856. In other cases, it would be best to rely
on abuse of office laws. Id. at 857.
77 See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
" 516 F.2d at 228.
7" Id.
" For cases which arose in an adjudicative setting after California Motor, see Ot-
ter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Airlines, lnc., 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1973); Israel v. Baxter Laboratories,
Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Semke v. Enid Auto Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361
(10th Cir. 1972); First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 398 F.
Supp. 917 (E.D. Pa. 1975); and United States Dental Institute v. American Ass'n of Or-
thodontists, 396 F. Supp, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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process.... Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are
involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking
refuge under the umbrella of 'political expression.' "" Metro Cable
read this language as establishing a separate, albeit uncertain standard
to be applied in an adjudicative setting." The City Council of Rock-
ford, on the other hand, was found to be a legislative body," which
the court regarded as per se political." Thus, the court applied the
traditional Noerr standard. Under Noerr, the mere granting by the
Council of a franchise to CATV . and a denial of Metro's application
would not constitute an antitrust violation even if brought about by
CATV's unethical behavior. 85 Therefore, the court concluded that
CATV's efforts to influence the Council, even if unethical or abusive,
were immune unless Metro could prove a traditional sham."
It is submitted that Metro Cable's analysis is plausible, but incor-
rect. California Motor distinguished between political and adjudicative
settings, not legislative and judicial settings." it is suggested that the
reference to "political" and "adjudicative" rather than "legislative" and
"judicial" properly places emphasis, not on the form of the govern-
mental unit, but rather on the nature of the acts of the alleged con-
spirators. This is consistent with Noerr, which held that the Sherman
Act does not extend to genuine efforts to influence the legislative and
executive branches because such efforts are political in nature and may
involve the exercise of First Amendment rights."
The key to a Noerr defense—the presence of political activity or
the exercise of First Amendment rights—must be viewed in the
operative context of the affected governmental body to determine
whether the acts of the conspirators were appropriate to the function
of the affected governmental body. A legislature generally acts in a
political context. Nevertheless, the fact that there is an effort to influ-
ence the legislature should not end the inquiry, for Noerr should not
be read to protect activities such as blackmail, coercion, bribery, and
the like," because such activities are not legitimately political. Simi-
" 404 U.S. at 513.
82 516 F.2d at 228.
"Id. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 24, § 11 (Supp. 1975).
84 /d.
86
	 365 U.S. at 135-36, 140-41.
86 516 F.2d at 229.
" 404 U.S. at 512-13.
85 365 U.S. at 137-38.
" Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096,
1099 (9th Cir. 1971) (threats, coercion, and intimidation are not the type of communi-
cation protected in Noerr); cf. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. i72, 177 (1965) (proof that patent office was defrauded was sufficient
to strip defendant of exemption from antitrust laws); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson &
Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (bribery
of state purchasing agent can result in a violation of the antitrust laws). But see Cow
Palace Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo. 1975) which
concluded that the legality of the means used to influence the political branches of gov-
ernment is irrelevant to the Noerr analysis because the conduct is political. Id. at 705.
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!arty, the concern in California Motor for abuses of governmental pro-
cess cannot rationally be limited to the judicial system." Whether par-
ticular conduct amounts to an abuse will depend on whether the gov-
ernmental body is acting politically or non-politically. In Metro Cable,
the court appears to have concluded that a legislative body necessarily
acts in a political context." However, no such firm characterization is
possible. A legislature may act in an administrative or quasi-judicial
capacity; it may carry out certain ministerial duties in which political
considerations and discretion are absent. 92 Wholly legitimate efforts to
influence the legislature in its political functions may prove intolerable
in the context of these activities.
Nonetheless, the court in Metro Cable was correct in concluding
that the issuance of the cablevision franchise was an action political,
rather than adjudicative, in nature. The principle that the granting of
franchises is a political function is fairly well settled."' The Illinois
courts have found that "[t]he granting of franchises by municipalities
to utility companies or private persons to use the streets in the public
interest constitutes an exercise of the city's legislative authority."'" De-
spite the public hearing rules promulgated by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, cable television franchising appears to remain a
political/legislative function. Until recently, the franchising and regula-
tion of cable television were strictly under local control. Gradually,
however, the FCC has assumed responsibility for regulating the com-
munications aspects of cable television, leaving regulation of "local in-
cidents" to local authorities. 95 Local incidents include, among other
things, parties, duration, and coverage." The FCC felt that local au-
thorities should retain discretion in franchising, in a form of dual
jurisdiction. "[L]ocal governments are inescapably involved in the pro-
cess because cable makes use of streets and ways and because local au-
thorities are able to bring a special expertness to such matters....
Under the circumstances, a deliberately structured dualism is indi-
"In fact it is arguable that the judicial system, in making a record, is better
able—through the contempt, perjury, and appeals processes—to protect against abuses
than are the executive or legislative branches.
9 ' 516 F,2d at 228.
"See In re Clement, 2 Ohio App. 2d 201, 207 N.E.2d 573 (1965); Floyd Stamps
Rambler, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 119 Ohio App. 249, 188 N.E.2d 185
(1963) (per curiam); Wright v. DeFatta, 129 So.2d 614 (Ct. App. La. 1961).
83 See 12 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL. CORPORATIONS, 34.22 (3d ed.
1970). "Legislative" and "political" function are often used interchangeably. See Rubin v.
W.H. Hinman, Inc., 253 A.2d 708, 711 (Me. 1969).
" People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17 III. App. 3d 1090,
1097 (1st Dist. Ct. 1973). The court denied plaintiffs petition for mandamus to the City
Council of Chicago because mandamus will not lie againit a city council engaged in a
legislative matter. Id.
9° See Barnett, State, Federal, and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 685 (1972).
"Id. at 685.
521
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
cated; the industry seems uniquely suited to this kind of creative
federalism."97
The FCC prescribed certain minimum standards as to the fran-
chising of cable television and decided to administer those standards
through a certification process.° 8 In regard to franchising, the FCC
noted:
We expect that franchising authorities will publicly invite
applications, that all applications will be placed on public
file, that notice of such filings will be given, that where ap-
propriate a public hearing will be held to afford all in-
terested persons an opportunity to testify on the qualifica-
tions of the applicants, and that the franchising authority
will issue a public report setting forth the basis for its ac-
tion. Such public participation in the franchising process is
necessary to assure that the needs and desires of all seg-
ments of the community are carefully considered."
If these expectations were converted to requirements, either by the FCC
or the State, then the franchising of cable television would more
closely resemble an adjudicative process, in which case serious doubt
would be cast on Metro Cable since the court avoided interpreting
California Motor only by invoking the legislative-adjudicative distinc-
tion. At this point, however, it seems clear that the FCC has left dis-
cretion to local authorities to make a political decision: the "needs and
desires of all segments of the community,""° which are the focus of
the FCC franchising suggestions, are usually determined in a political
manner."' Indeed, in a case decided with the FCC regulations in ef-
fect, a state court held: "The power of the governing body of a city to
grant or refuse to grant a franchise is essentially legislative in nature
requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, and courts may not
inquire into the motives which prompt a municipality's legislative body
to enact an ordinance which is valid on its face."'"
Because the grant of a cable television franchise is essentially a
political decision, CATV's activities in influencing that decision pro-
cess would be protected political activity under Noerr, except where il-
legal or abusive of the political process. The importance of the court's
characterization of the alleged bribe as a campaign contribution is
therefore strikingly evident. Bribery is not legitimate political activity
and should not be protected under Noerr. On the other hand, a cam-
117 FCC, Cable Television Service; Cable Television Relay Service, 37 Fed. Reg.
3252, 3276 (1972).
"47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (Supp. 1974). See also note 10 supra.
"FCC, Cable Television Service; Cable Television Relay Service, 37 Fed. Reg.
3252, 3276 (1972) (emphasis added).
no Id.
101 See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (19491.
'" Capitol Cable, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 209 Kan. 152, 161, 495 P.2d 885,
892-93 (1972).
522
NOTES
paign contribution is legitimate political activity, as is extensive lobby-
ing, and is therefore not subject to antitrust liability. Thus, accepting
the court's characterization, the decision in Metro Cable was correct.
C. The Sham Exception
Metro Cable applied the California Motor test to determine the
presence of a sham even though the court had concluded earlier that
California Motor was intended to be applied only in an adjudicative
setting.'° 3 Despite language to the contrary, the court may have felt
that California Motor's sham test should be extended to a legislative set-
ting. In any case, the court held that Metro had not alleged a sham
under that test.'"
California Motor retained from Noerr the essential element of the
sham analysis—a sham exists where there is an attempt to injure a
competitor directly, rather than a genuine effort to influence
government.'" Justice Douglas could simply have held that the de-
fendants' activities in California Motor fell within the Noerr sham excep-
tion as an attempt to directly injure competitors. This approach was
taken by the concurring judges in California Motor, who disagreed with
the majority's First Amendment discussion,'" but nevertheless felt
that defendants' acts constituted a Noerr sham.'" The majority, how-
ever, seemed to add to the sham doctrine the notion that a sham
exists—at least in an adjudicative context—if the manner of exercise
of the right of petition and association, when considered with the
defendant's other activities against competitors, indicate a true intent
to injure them directly rather than an effort to influence government
action. 1 U" Thus defendants in California Motor were found to have di-
rectly injured plaintiffs by acting to effectively deny them access to
agencies and courts—access required in order to gain otherwise pub-
licly available operating rights. 1 °" Furthermore, the intent to directly
injure was gleaned from defendants' unyielding and undiscriminating
opposition to plaintiffs' applications."°
103 516 F.2d at 228.
'" Id. at 232.
'" California Motor, 404 U.S. at 511-12; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
'"° 404 U.S. at 516 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Brennan felt that the majority's discussion of antitrust liability stemming from the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights "retreats from Noerr, and in the process tramples upon
important First Amendment values." Id. The concurring justices evidently Felt that
under the majority's analysis, Noerr would not protect defendants' activities even if a
sham were not proven; the exercise of First Amendment rights in an abusive manner
would preclude Noerr protection. For a detailed analysis of the relatiOn between the
Constitution and antitrust laws, see Note, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor
View of the Antitrust and Constitutional Ramifications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U.
CIN. L. REV, 281 (1973).
167 404 U.S. at 518 (concurring opinion).
'"8 Id. at 514-15.
'"9 /d. at 509-10.
"° Id. at 515.
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This same test should be equally applicable to a political setting:
the nature of the defendant's acts may be examined to determine the
presence of an intent to injure competitors directly through abusive
efforts to influence the political process. The post-California Motor
sham exception, thus viewed, appears to subject to Sherman Act liabil-
ity all petitions to the government which are a "mere pretext" for in-
flicting direct harm.'"
The court in Metro Cable concluded that Metro had not shown "a
sham under the California Motor test. "Plaintiff's injury was caused by
the governmental action which defendants genuinely attempted to
secure and succeeded in securing. $9112 Defendants' acts were not "a
pretext for inflicting on plaintiff an injury not caused by any govern-
mental action." 13 The court further concluded that, unlike the total
denial of access in California Motor, the "denial" of hearings on
Metro's franchise application did not constitute a sham." 4 It is sub-
mitted that despite the court's effective extension of Noerr protection
to undeserving activity—bribery disguised as campaign
contributions—its failure to find a sham exercise of defendants' con-
stitutionally protected rights to petition and lobby, once the compan-
ion activity was deemed legitimate, was correct. In Metro Cable, the ef-
fective denial of access which was the alleged illegal result of CATV's
actions," in fact occurred through the City Council's failure to grant
a hearing, whereas in California Motor, the defendants themselves acted
to deny access by making the costs of that access prohibitory."
CATV could not have effected a denial of access absent Council ac-
quiescence. Because whatever denial of access that occurred was the
immediate result of governmental acts, CATV's efforts to influence
the Council did not constitute a pretext for inflicting direct harm and
thus were not a sham. However tenuous the distinction may be in
terms of ultimate effect, it is one which appears intended by the Su-
preme Court, and, indeed necessary in order to preserve the opera-
tion of the Noerr doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Metro Cable is an important case because it is the first decision,
analyzing a Noerr problem in a political setting within the
post-California Motor framework, and thus will likely influence the fu-
ture direction of the Noerr doctrine. Though it did apply the liberal
California Motor sham exception test, Metro Cable read the basic Noerr
protection expansively. A better result would be achieved by reading
Noerr and California Motor together, avoiding separate rules for each
'" 516 F.2d at 229.
" 2 1d. at 232.
"3 Id. at 229.
" 4 Id. at 232.
"3 1d.
404 U.S. at 511.
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branch of government. The test should focus on the nature of the al-
leged conspirators' acts—whether there was a genuine exercise of
First Amendment rights or political activity. This in turn may be
judged only in the context of the type of government
function—political or adjudicative—sought to be influenced. The
sham exception should be broad enough to allow an examination of
the alleged political activity and exercise of the right to petition in
order to determine whether the intent of the parties was to influence
governmental action, or whether it was to injure the competitor di-
rectly through an abuse of governmental function. The former is pro-
tected public activity; the latter essentially unprotected private action.
The mere •presence of government in the picture cannot end the
inquiry. The wide-ranging involvement of "governmental units" in
business-related activities suggests that in order for the policies of the
antitrust laws to be effectuated, the Noerr doctrine must be defined
more clearly; it is political activity and First Amendment rights which
are to be protected, not anti-competitive business activity.'" At the
same time, acts such as bribery should never be immune under Noerr,
as they are not protected political activity or exercise of First Amend-
ment rights.
Unfortunately, Metro Cable is less than instructive in this confus-
ing area. The court did not read plaintiffs complaint as alleging a
bribe and thus avoided reaching any conclusion as to whether the
presence of an official co-conspirator—as an abuse of governmental
process—would remove Noerr protection. The court merely held that
"campaign contributions" did not make the mayor and alderman co-
conspirators. It is thus still an open question whether the presence of
an official co-conspirator would remove the Noerr protection." 8
STEPHEN R. LAMSON
Labor—Effect of Negotiating Impasse on an Employer's Right to
Withdraw From a Multi-Employer Bargaining Association—NLRB v.
Beck Engraving Co.' — Respondent, Beck Engraving Company, was a
member of the Allied Printing Employer's Association (the Associa-
tion), 2 a multi-employer bargaining unit. As an Association member,
" See Woods Exploration '& Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
Metro did not apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In fact, an
attorney for Metro, when queried, stated that the case had been dropped. Conversation
with Richard M. Calkins, Burditt & Calkins, Chicago, Ill., March 23, 1976. CATV, on
the other hand, is required by the FCC to come into compliance with federal regula-
tions by 1977. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 38 F.C.C. 2d 10, 14-15 (1972), petition for recon-
sideratian denied, 40 F.C.C. 2d 493 (1973). It is possible that Metro may be awaiting a
failure by CATV to comply before renewing its challenge.
522 F.2d 475, 90 L.R.R.M. 2089 (3d Cir. 1975).
5 1d. at 477, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2090.
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